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1Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering 
of Private and Business Law 
Gregory Shaffer* 
This symposium theorizes and assesses transnational legal ordering of private 
law and business regulation in relation to the state. Such law and regulation seek to 
produce order in an issue area that relevant actors construe as a problem. The issues 
that the symposium covers include labor rights, corporate social responsibility, the 
regulation of financial derivatives, and the allocation of authority among courts to 
hear transnational disputes. The applicable norms adopt various forms and they 
vary in their formally binding nature. They are transnational insofar as they 
transcend and permeate state boundaries. The symposium evaluates developments 
in these areas, and the challenges and limits various initiatives face. It concludes 
with articles by leading theorists of private law from a transnational perspective. 
The participants engage with the theoretical lens of Transnational Legal Orders
(or TLOs) as elaborated in a book by Terence Halliday and Gregory Shaffer.1 That
book’s conclusion noted areas for future research and set forth a series of 
hypotheses that arose inductively from the book’s empirical studies in different 
substantive areas. The conclusion, in particular, noted the need to address private 
law and private ordering in relation to the TLO framework. This symposium helps 
fill that gap. It addresses each of the substantive issues noted above, and includes 
theoretical articles regarding the public/private distinction and the role of the state 
in relation to TLO theory.
Private law and business regulation increasingly are shaped transnationally in 
different ways. As countries liberalize markets and private actors engage in 
transnational exchange, private law and regulatory institutions adapt. This 
symposium assesses and evaluates the extent that changes in private law and 
business regulation transcend the state and give rise to transnational legal orders. By 
a transnational legal order, Halliday and Shaffer refer to law and regulation that seek 
to produce order in an issue area that relevant actors construe as a “problem”; that 
are legal insofar as they adopt legal form to address the problem, including through 
directly or indirectly engaging national legal bodies; and that are transnational insofar
as they transcend and permeate state boundaries. The symposium participants 
* Gregory Shaffer is Chancellor’s Professor, University of California, Irvine School of Law. 
1.  TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer eds., 2015) 
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respectively evaluate privately made norms addressing labor protection (Larry Catá 
Backer) and corporate social responsibility (Cynthia Williams), the regulation of 
financial derivatives (Hannah Buxbaum), conflict-of-laws regimes (Christopher 
Whytock), legal pluralism and TLOs (Peer Zumbansen), and the state as a TLO 
(Ralf Michaels).
The symposium begins with Larry Catá Backer’s article “Are Supply Chains 
Transnational Legal Orders? What We Can Learn from the Rana Plaza Factory Collapse.” In 
this article, Backer examines in detail the array of state and non-state actors engaged 
in reforming the governance of global supply chains operating in Bangladesh and 
elsewhere. The actors include the United States (U.S.) and European Union (EU), 
U.S and European multinational companies, labor unions, civil society 
organizations, the International Labor Organization (ILO), the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and Bangladesh itself. A group 
of North American apparel companies and retailers, known as the Alliance for 
Bangladesh Worker Safety (the “Alliance”), agreed to a series of initiatives and 
commitments to enhance worker safety and protection in Bangladesh. In parallel, a 
group of largely European apparel companies and retailers, grouped as the Accord 
on Fire and Building Safety in Bangladesh (the “Accord”), developed their own 
initiative that arguably was more stringent in its requirements. Modeled after the 
ILO’s tripartite form of governance, the Accord includes government, labor, and 
business representatives in a Steering Committee that is presided by a representative 
of the ILO. A third group of enterprises created the “Arrangement,” a voluntary 
mechanism for providing remedies to victims and their families, autonomous of the 
state and its courts. In parallel, the U.S. and EU used their leverage to press 
Bangladesh to reform its labor laws and institutions, and the ILO and OECD 
engaged in new norm making regarding global supply chain governance.
From his review of the fallout of the Rana Plaza factory collapse, Backer 
applies TLO theory and two alternative theoretical frames: polycentric ordering and 
neo-colonial state-based ordering. He analyzes their differences and 
complementarities. Under each frame, he notes the shift in law and governance 
away from the ideal notion of autonomous territorial states toward transnational 
legal ordering and governance arrangements. He shows how the Rana Plaza Factory 
collapse uncovers the dynamic, complex interweaving of national law, international 
standards, and private governance that, together, could be viewed as a transnational 
legal order. Yet, he also stresses how such legal ordering is polycentrically fractured, 
calling into question the extent of transnational settlement over the applicable labor 
norms.  He thus suggests that it may be premature to speak of any settled order in 
the absence of principles to manage the interactions among the different Rana Plaza 
initiatives. He concludes that facts on the ground are shifting dynamically, which, in 
turn, must inform theory.
Cynthia Williams’s article, “The Global Reporting Initiative, Transnational 
Corporate Accountability, and Global Regulatory Counter-Currents,” examines the 
development of corporate responsibility as a form of governance that takes a “new 
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governance,” soft-law approach by focusing on disclosure and transparency. The
Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) is a particularly significant initiative adopting this 
approach, and its environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reporting has 
become a global benchmark. As Williams notes, “82% of the Global 250 companies 
use GRI as the basis for their corporate responsibility reporting. And as of 2015, 
93% of the global 250 companies publish a stand-alone social report.”2 GRI reports 
must include general and specific disclosures relevant to the industry, and set out 
specific facts about the effects of a company’s operations on the environment, 
society, and the economy. 
The challenge with these voluntary reports, nonetheless, is that they often are 
not comparable and so give little practical information for purposes of comparing 
company performance. Such reporting also does not guarantee any real 
sustainability impact, and some studies find that the GRI has not achieved much on 
the ground. In contrast, a number of studies of particular mandatory non-financial 
disclosure regimes have found operational effects, such as regarding water quality, 
toxic release, mine safety, and restaurant quality. Williams contends that, consistent 
with findings in the area of financial disclosure, “to have operational effects, 
disclosure must be mandatory (so that disclosers cannot be selective in what they 
disclose), specific, and targeted to clearly identified users.”3 She finds potential hope 
in developments regarding mandatory reporting. For example, “many European 
countries or their stock exchanges, and the European Union itself, require some 
environmental or social disclosure, to varying degrees of specificity.”4
Unlike the area of corporate social responsibility, which involves soft law 
(whether because it is voluntary or because it involves only disclosure), Williams 
points out that other areas of binding hard law have developed that work counter 
to sustainability goals. Williams notes, in particular, the proliferation of investor-
state arbitration procedures, which grant rights to corporations to challenge national 
and local regulatory decisions before arbitral panels whose rulings are binding. She 
thus presses scholars of corporate social responsibility initiatives to address them in 
the broader context of other forms of transnational legal ordering with which they 
compete, conflict, and interact.
Regarding the TLO theoretical framework, Williams notes its important stress 
on studying the ordering of local practice, as opposed to studying only international 
or transnational formal texts that can be symbolic. As she writes, “how do particular 
transnational frameworks ‘touch down’ in legal processes, contracts, or proceedings, 
which by definition will involve local specification and an attention to hard law and 
legal power, and what are the conflicts and contestations that the transnational 
2.  Cynthia Williams, The Global Reporting Initiative, Transnational Corporate Accountability, and Global 
Regulatory Counter-Currents, 1 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L AND COMP L. 67, 74 (2016). 
3.  Id., at 82. 
4.  Id., at 72. 
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regime engenders in the process.”5 What researchers must do, she asserts, pointing 
to the TLO framework, is ask “Which norms, really, have settled where, in which 
legal processes, and why?”6
Hannah Buxbaum’s article, “Transnational Legal Ordering and Regulatory 
Conflict: Lessons from the Regulation of Cross-Border Derivatives,” addresses the regulation 
of over-the-counter (OTC) financial derivatives. Despite the impulse provided by 
the global financial crisis and considerable efforts, little convergence or settlement 
of legal norms have occurred across states. States have reached consensus on certain 
general principles, but significant regulatory divergence persists regarding their 
implementation. Parts of a TLO have been shaped by a private ordering regime, 
that of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA), a transnational 
private trade association, which has created a Master Agreement and schedules that 
provide standardized documentation for OTC derivatives transactions. These 
standardized contracts have become the global market norm. But convergence and 
settlement of public regulatory norms has been limited. 
The political economy of regulatory competition, Buxbaum explains, has 
limited convergence in derivatives regulation. Although national governments want 
to regulate derivative markets in order to counter systemic financial risks, they also 
wish to attract capital. “Lawmakers therefore face continuing tension between the 
need to strengthen regulation in the cross-border sphere and the desire to maintain 
the competitiveness of their markets.”7 There have also been challenges of issue 
alignment (in the U.S., different agencies address the issues differently), diagnostic 
difference (regarding the nature of the problem), and a return of unilateralism 
(including in rulemaking by the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 
which catalyzed European protests regarding the regulations’ extraterritorial scope). 
Although common legal norms have not settled in this area, she contends that 
a form of a TLO based on conflict of laws has developed. Domestic regulators work 
within a framework of transnational norms regarding the allocation of regulatory 
jurisdiction. They evaluate each other’s regulations to determine whether they 
recognize them as equivalent to their own, and thus sufficient. And they engage in 
intensive regulatory cooperation and information sharing with each other for 
purposes of their own domestic securities law enforcement. Under this approach, 
she notes, ultimately “it is domestic law, in the form of an equivalence or 
comparability determination, that dictates whether compliance with a foreign 
regime will be accepted as sufficient.”8 Such a system, she stresses, tolerates 
regulatory diversity and uses “conflicts methodology to manage that divergence.”9
5.  Id., at 81. 
6.  Id., at 88-89. 
7.  Hannah Buxbaum, Transnational Legal Ordering and Regulatory Conflict: Lessons from the Regulation 
of Cross-Border Derivatives, 1 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L AND COMP L. 91, 95 (2016). 
8.  Id., at 114. 
9.  Id., at 116. 
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Christopher Whytock’s article, “Conflict of Laws, Global Governance, and 
Transnational Legal Order,” starts by recalling that conflict-of-laws rules govern three 
basic questions: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of 
judgments. Globally, there is no single harmonized conflict-of-laws TLO. Rather, 
conflict-of-laws rules are largely national and they allocate governance authority 
among different national jurisdictions. They produce order, but they do so in a 
decentralized manner with little settlement of global conflict-of-laws norms across 
national jurisdictions. Thus, he writes, “conflict of laws contributes to transnational 
legal order, yet conflict of laws is itself transnationally disordered.”10
Whytock notes, however, that conflict-of-laws rules have certain common 
principles, one of which is comity and another of which is the international law 
grounds for exercising jurisdiction. He writes: 
The principle of comity “suggests at a minimum an opposition to a 
categorically parochial approach, whereby a court would always assert 
jurisdiction, always apply its own nation’s law, and never recognize or 
enforce a judgment of another nation’s court, and a recognition that 
deference to another nation’s authority is at least sometimes appropriate—
by applying that nation’s law, respecting the jurisdiction of its courts, or 
recognizing or enforcing the judgments of its courts. In addition, public 
international law principles of jurisdiction—although contested—
contribute to the allocation of governance authority by placing limits on 
the jurisdiction of states to prescribe, enforce and adjudicate.”11
There are nonetheless a series of developments in this area that give rise to 
TLOs regionally and in certain substantive fields. In at least two regions (Europe 
and Latin America) and two specialized areas of law (family law and commercial 
law), conflict of laws is increasingly harmonized by international treaty, coordinated 
under the auspices of the Hague Conference on Private International Law,12 such 
that common norms can settle across national borders, leading to conflict-of-laws 
TLOs. The European regional TLO, through the European Union, is particularly 
institutionalized, adopted by a European regional body and enforced by a European 
regional court in coordination with national ones. As regards choice of law, these 
rules specify what substantive law (such as what tort or contract law) applies to a 
particular transnational situation. In terms of subject area TLOs developed through 
the Hague Conference, the family conflict-of-laws TLO is more advanced than the 
commercial one. Over ninety nations have ratified international child abduction and 
adoption conventions, and there is significant national jurisprudence applying them. 
10. Christopher A. Whytock, Conflict of Laws, Global Governance, and Transnational Legal Order, 1 
U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L AND COMP L. 117, 119 (2016). 
11.  Id., at 123 (footnote omitted). 
12.  The Hague Conference is “an international organization with seventy-eight members that 
seeks the progressive unification of conflict-of-laws rules and private international law rules more 
generally through the production of international conventions and other legal instruments.” Id., at 131. 
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In substantive areas where norms are only partially settled, conflict-of-laws 
rules interact with national substantive law, such as in bankruptcy law (studied by 
Halliday)13 and securities law (studied by Buxbaum).14 They help determine “which
set of norms should govern which transnational bankruptcy or secured transactions 
problems (choice of law), which courts (or other dispute resolution systems) should 
adjudicate those problems (jurisdiction), and when courts in one nation should 
recognize and enforce another nation’s resolution of those problems (recognition 
and enforcement of judgments).”15 The result is a decentralized form of 
transnational legal ordering. 
Ralf Michaels’s article, “State Law as a Transnational Legal Order,” turns to the 
theoretical plane by arguing that state law itself is transnationalized, and so state law 
and TLOs are not distinct categories. He contends that TLO theory, as a result, 
goes much further than providing a theory of a transnational body of law. It rather 
points toward a theory of legal ordering tout court. Michaels writes:
Transnational suggests, in its term already, less an overcoming than a 
transcending of the state. Transnational law (TL) is not above the state (like 
supranational law), nor between states (like international law), nor, 
necessarily, outside of states (like non-state law, though a connection 
between non-state law and transnational law is often made). . . 
[T]ransnational law, somehow, cuts through the distinction between 
national and international, and thus between what is within and what is 
without the state. It promises, in this sense to be law not without but beyond
the state.16
Michaels notes the ongoing critical role of the state in TLO theory. Its role 
includes norm construction (providing legal norms adapted transnationally), 
enforcement (enforcing transnational legal norms), recognition (recognizing 
transnational hard and soft law norms as state law), and legitimation (through 
incorporating the norms in state law and practice).
From this vantage, he questions whether state law and TLOs are qualitatively 
different, to which I respond below. In contending that states can be TLOs, 
Michaels maintains (reflecting a conflict-of-laws orientation) that states often 
produce norms that are applied transnationally and thus no transnational institution 
is needed. In his words, “instead of defining transnational rules as those created by 
transnational institutions, we should define transnational institutions as those 
13.  See Terence C. Halliday, Architects of the State: International organizations and the Reconstruction of 
States in East Asia, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERING AND STATE CHANGE 1, 89, (Gregory 
Shaffer ed., 2013); Block-Lieb and Terence C. Halliday, Settling and Concordance: Two Cases in Global 
Commercial Law, in TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS 3, 75, (Terence C. Halliday & Gregory Shaffer 
eds., 2015). 
14.  Buxbaum, supra note 7. 
15.  Whytock, supra note 10, at 139. 
16.  Ralf Michaels, State Law as a Transnational Legal Order, 1 U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L
AND COMP L. 141, 141 (2016). 
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producing transnational rules. If this is so, then the state certainly qualifies.”17 Going 
further, he contends, “there is very little left to [purely] national legal orders.”18
Peer Zumbansen’s article “Where the Wild Things Are: Journeys to Transnational 
Legal Orders, and Back” concludes the symposium by pointing to the importance of 
theorizing “transnational law” “as a methodological lens through which to 
scrutinize the emerging and evolving actors, norms and processes both within and 
beyond the confines of the nation-state, a region or a municipality, a group or any 
other form of collective.”19 While conventional international law scholarship 
focuses on states and public law, and much transnational law scholarship focuses 
on private actors and private law, Zumbansen agrees with the authors of 
Transnational Legal Orders that both state and non-state actors and processes, and the 
norms they promote, must be studied to understand the transnational. Going back 
to the legal realists, he shows the ongoing need to call into question the public-
private divide when it comes to law and governance and their impact. He thus 
welcomes TLO theorists’ invitation to revisit the private law focus of some 
transnational law theory.20
Zumbansen also stresses how much of conventional theorizing uses concepts 
from the West as universals that are not fit to situations outside of it. He points to 
the critical role of post-colonial and Third World Approaches to International law 
(TWAIL) for undermining universal pretensions and in advancing the need for a 
more pluralist form of theorizing that accounts for the lived experiences of people 
outside the West. What we must do in studying the transnational, Zumbansen 
stresses, is return to core legal realist insights regarding the importance of context. 
Scholars should work not in a false heaven of concepts (especially those drawing 
only from Western conventions, such as of the rule of law), but rather from the 
messy world of facts. In doing so, scholars must attend to those voices that are not 
being heard and reflected. We must, going back to the legal realists, constantly ask 
“the hard questions as to who does what how and in whose interests.”21 To address these 
questions, we must turn to a focus on actors, norms and processes in particular 
contexts.
What Zumbansen means by “Where the Wild Things Are” is that the 
methodological construct of transnational law thrusts us into a new terrain where 
traditional distinctions as state and non-state, public and private, are less useful 
because so much governance has become hybridized. The sheer complexity of the 
situation makes normative assessment and critique much more difficult, and at the 
same time urgent. We badly need frameworks and empirical studies to ground our 
understanding of the transnational, but at the same time, Zumbansen insists, this is 
17.  Id., at 154. 
18.  Id., at 155. 
19.  Peer Zumbansen, Where the Wild Things Are: Journeys to Transnational Legal Orders, and Back, 1 
U.C. IRVINE J. INT’L TRANSNAT’L AND COMP L. 161, 166 (2016). 
20.  See also Gregory Shaffer, Theorizing Transnational Legal Ordering, Annual Review of Social Science,
(forthcoming 2016). 
21.   Zumbansen, supra note 19, at 192. 
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not sufficient since we must act in the world and thus also need to develop 
normative parameters, grounded in a pluralist approach, with which to engage with 
the new world of transnational law.
THE SYMPOSIUM’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO TLO THEORY.
The scholars in this symposium seriously engage with TLO theory in light of 
the social problems that societies confront today and the role that private and 
business law play transnationally in providing order. They help advance TLO 
theorizing, and theorizing generally, in critical ways. 
Backer and Williams highlight the key roles of private actors, such as non-
governmental organizations, in creating norms that engage private practices around 
the globe, such as in the areas of labor and corporate law. Both authors critically 
show the importance of studying local practice and social dynamics to assess the 
existence and operation of TLOs, rather than analyzing only legal texts agreed at 
the transnational level. They also call attention to the need to study how different 
transnational norms interact, as opposed to studying them in isolation. Williams 
shows how new governance models can give rise to broader TLO structures, such 
as regarding disclosure norms, but she raises the hypotheses that disclosure regimes 
will more likely be effective if they are mandatory (and not voluntary) and if they 
permit for comparisons that facilitate informed stakeholder responses. 
Buxbaum and Whytock show the ongoing importance of conflict-of-laws rules 
as an alternative to the creation of common substantive norms for transnational 
legal ordering. The conflicts approach, in particular, facilitates transnational 
ordering where effective and legitimate transnational institutions are lacking. 
Buxbaum shows the efforts and challenges of creating substantive law TLOs to 
address securities, such as financial derivatives. Because of ongoing regulatory 
competition among states, coupled with divergent state regulatory preferences, the 
legal ordering of derivatives remains predominantly national, other than a privately 
developed regime that provides for standardized derivative contracts that has 
become the global norm. As a result, conflict-of-laws rules are needed to provide a 
decentralized form of public legal ordering through the allocation of governance 
functions among national jurisdictions, albeit within a framework of high-level, 
transnational regulatory principles and common transnational contracts. Whytock
likewise shows how private international law remains a critically important, 
decentralized alternative for transnational legal ordering. Yet, Whytock also shows 
how areas within private international law itself have become governed through 
treaties that can give rise to conflict-of-laws TLOs. He shows how these conflict-
of-laws TLOs take both a regional and a substantive law form. He and Buxbaum 
likewise show how transnational conflict-of-laws principles, such as the principles 
of comity and mutual recognition, can develop informally.
Michaels and Zumbansen conclude by offering important theoretical insights 
regarding the relation of the TLO framework to legal pluralism and the role of the 
state. Both authors rightly stress that the state and state institutions remain critical 
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to TLO theory, unlike in other transnational law theory. As Michaels notes, “One 
could say that these TLOs ‘borrow’ the state’s institutions, and the state, in turn, 
lends out its courts.”22 Under TLO theory, state law indeed becomes TLO law in 
subject areas when transnational legal norms are adopted and practiced in a settled, 
concordant way so that a new normal arises regarding the social understanding of 
the legal norms that apply.23
Like Buxbaum and Whytock, Michaels stresses how national norms can apply 
and produce order transnationally. Indeed, he is right that TLO theory must be 
open to the study of TLOs that arise without a transnational institution. Halliday, 
Shaffer and their collaborators have so far largely studied TLOs that involve 
transnational institutions and networks in particular subject areas in which a 
common conception of a problem is defined, and norms recursively interact up, 
down, and across transnational, national, and local levels of social organization. 
However, there is no requirement that a centralized transnational institution exist in 
order for a TLO to develop. Rather, when norms become concordant and settle 
transnationally, then one can speak of a TLO, whether or not a transnational 
institution is part of that process. 
Halliday and Shaffer, in their book Transnational Legal Orders, nonetheless differ 
from Michaels regarding the scope of his claims that states are TLOs today, as when 
he writes, “TLOs are not an anomaly but the norm; all laws are, presumably, 
TLOs.”24 Michaels writes from the perspective of legal theory, inflected by systems 
theory, at a more abstract level, whereas Halliday and Shaffer write from that of 
socio-legal theory at a more empirical level. The two approaches at times view the 
relation of state law and transnational law from different vantages. In much legal 
theory, grounded in legal formalism and legal positivism, state law is enclosed within 
a state constitutional order that provides secondary norms that define the law to be 
recognized and applied by national courts. Much of transnational law theory, 
building from Niklas Luhmann’s society-based conception of law, calls into 
question that state-centric, legal formalist picture from a theoretical perspective, 
noting that state law in reality is transnational law, as Michaels contends. 
TLO theory, however, is a particular empirically-focused socio-legal theory 
that examines the normative settlement of legal norms that transcend national 
territorial boundaries. Critical to TLO theory is that state law and TLO law may or 
may not be the same, depending on how legal norms settle in actual legal practice. 
Where legal norms settle with radically different meanings in different national 
contexts, no TLO (as Halliday and Shaffer define it) exists. TLO and state law 
norms, however, are at times the same, since states serve to generate, enforce, and 
22.  Michaels, supra note 16, at 160. 
23.  TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 1, at 43-44. 
24.  Michaels, supra note 16, at 160. Michaels’s approach parallels that of Patrick Glenn in his 
book. See PATRICK GLENN, THE COSMOPOLITAN STATE vii (2013) (“states are cosmopolitan in their 
origins, structures, populations, sources, and thought”). 
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legitimate transnational legal norms, and these norms can settle concordantly. Yet, 
as Buxbaum and others show, the creation of TLOs is often unsuccessful in 
practice, and TLOs when formed can also unravel.25 Scholars using this framework 
find many efforts to create TLOs, but many initiatives fail or only partially succeed. 
The TLO theoretical approach does not predict that TLOs inevitably form; rather, 
it provides a framework through which to address the success, failure, 
transformation, settlement, and unsettlement of legal norms across states. As 
Whytock and Buxbaum show in this symposium, when TLOs do not develop, 
conflict-of-laws rules—with no coordination through a transnational institution—
retain importance as a form of transnational legal ordering. To apply TLO socio-
legal theory, one must assess empirically whether there is a TLO in which the state 
and state law comprise a part, including for purposes of recognition, enforcement, 
and legitimation of the legal norms, or whether the legal norms have not settled 
concordantly across states and so no TLO (as Halliday and Shaffer define it) has 
been formed. 
For TLO theory, states are both factors and objects, as Michaels points out. 
States are factors in giving rise to TLOs in that state legal norms are often the origin 
of transnational ones, and transnational norms typically depend on states directly 
and indirectly, whether for their recognition, enforcement or legitimation. States are 
also objects in TLO theory in that the state and state law are transformed and 
transnationalized in the process. TLO theory is thus indeed an incipient theory of 
legal orders more broadly, and Michaels’s analysis helps to highlight and show the 
way. As he writes, “transnational law is no longer [viewed as] a body of law and does 
indeed become a theory of law—though one informed no longer by state law as the 
model but instead of TLOs as the model.”26 Legal theory should engage with the 
phenomenon of TLOs for the reasons Michaels highlights, and empirical socio-legal 
theory should address the reach and limits of TLOs within national and local legal 
practice.
Finally, as Zumbansen stresses, the study of TLOs should engage with theories 
of legal pluralism in light of the different social contexts in which law operates. In 
a legal pluralist vein, Zumbansen points to the ongoing importance of normative 
evaluation of TLOs since TLOs often impose Western concepts which are ill-suited 
to local contexts. There is thus a need for both empirical study of how TLOs 
operate, and ongoing normative engagement and critique of TLOs in light of the 
different contextualized challenges that societies face today.
25.  See Terence C. Halliday and Gregory Shaffer, Researching Transnational Legal Orders, in 
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 1, at 507-11. 
26.  Michaels, supra note 16, at 160. 
